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JAPANESE-AUTo PRODUCTS V. BBS -A THREAT TO EXACERBATE U.S.-
JAPANESE TRADE RELATIONS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout 1995, the Clinton Administration repeatedly met with
Japanese officials to negotiate an agreement to improve U.S.-Japanese
trade relations.' While many White House officials claimed a victory
in the resulting "llth-hour" trade pact,2 several U.S. patent experts
were still lamenting a controversial Tokyo High Court decision that
may further aggravate already tense U.S.-Japanese trade relations and
give rise to a new trade quarrel. 3  In Japanese-Auto Products v. BBS
Inc. ,4 the Tokyo High Court held that even though a German com-
pany owned patents in both Germany and Japan for its product, a
Japanese company could legally purchase that product in Germany,
import it into Japan, and sell it for profit without violating the Ger-
man company's patent rights. This ruling departed significantly from
long-standing patent practices in most countries, including the United
States and Japan;6 however, a much broader problem overshadowed
this decision- a huge trade deficit with Japan. Now that the pact
with Japan has addressed the trade deficit problem, U.S. officials
must turn their attention to this little publicized case and its conse-
quences.
This Note analyzes Japanese-Auto Products and its impact on
U.S. companies and the tense U.S.-Japanese trade relationship. Part II
introduces the case -and discusses its relation to different trademark and
1. See U.S., Japan Both Claim Victory in Trade Accord, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 30,
1995, at 41 [hereinafter U.S., Japan Both Claim Vrictory].
2. See id.
3. See Teresa Riordan, Tokyo Court Ruling Could Set Off New Trade Rift with the United
States over Protection of Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995, at D2.
4. 1524 HANREI JIHO 3 (Tokyo High Court, Mar. 23, 1995), translated in Judgment to
the Case of NE No. 3272/1994 (July 5, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola
of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal).
5. See Riordan, supra note 3.
6. See id.
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patent7 concepts, including parallel importation and the "first-sale"
doctrine. Part m1 specifically discusses the impact of the Japanese-
Auto Products' decision on the concept of parallel importation. Next,
Part IV addresses the relationship between the "first-sale" doctrine to
the case. Part V briefly reviews the current tension in the U.S.-
Japanese trade relationship and the analyzes the decision's effects on
this relationship. Finally, Part VI analyzes several practical consid-
erations that critics of the Japanese-Auto Products decision have not
yet addressed.
I1. JAPANESE-AUTo PRODUCTS V. BBS: THE DECISION
On March 23, 1995, a*three-judge panel of the Tokyo High
Court8 ruled that even though appellee BBS Kraftfahrzeugtechnik
(BBS), a German company, owned patents on cast aluminum auto
wheels in both the Federal Republic of Germany and in Japan, appel-
lants Japanese-Auto Products Inc. (Japanese-Auto) and Lacimex Japan
Company could legally import the wheels made in Germany and sell
them in Japan at a higher price without violating BBS' Japanese pat-
ent.9 Consequently, BBS lost its right to profit a second time from a
product that it legitimately manufactured.
A. Facts
The parties did not dispute the underlying facts of the case. 10
7. A trademark is "a distinctive mark of authenticity, through which the products of par-
ticular manufacturers .. .may be distinguished from those of others." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1493 (6th ed. 1990). A patent is "[a] grant of right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling one's invention and includes [the] right to license others to make, use
or sell [that invention]." Id. at 1125.
"A trademark is not patentable .... A trademark gives its owner the right to exclude
others from using the same or similar marks in a way likely to cause confusion . . . among
[buyers]." DAVID A. BURGE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK TACTICS AND PRACTICE 112-13
(1980). Patents, on the other hand, "are granted on advances in the useful arts, not on sym-
bols, words, or devices that identify and distinguish goods or services .... A patent gives its
owner a right to exclude others from making, using, or selling a particular [good]." Id. Thus,
trademarks and patents "give their respective owners different kinds of rights." Id.
8. The Tokyo High Court, a court of appeal, is the most important of Japan's eight high
courts. See ELLIOTr J. HAHN, JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 19 (1984).
9. See Riordan, supra note 3.
10. 'See Japanese-Auto Products, 1524 HANREI JIHO 3 (Tokyo High Ct., Mar. 23,
1995), translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994 at 6 (July 5, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Corn-
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BBS owned the patent fights in Japan and Germany, BBS sold the
products in Germany after its German patent became valid, and
the aluminum auto wheels at issue fell within the scope of BBS'
Japanese patent." The dispute boiled down to whether Japanese-
Auto could legitimately profit on the sale of a product in Japan
when BBS owned the product's patent.
At the trial court level, the Tokyo District Court12 ruled in fa-
vor of BBS.1 3 The district court ordered Japanese-Auto to pay 4.8
million yen (approximately US $59,000) to BBS.1 4  This sum
equaled the seven percent royalty that Japanese import agencies
ordinarily paid to foreign suppliers.' 5 Nevertheless, BBS was not
content with this ruling. 6 It sought 11.2 million yen in damages
(roughly US $110,000) and an injunction against Japanese-Auto
from importing BBS' wheels. 7
B. Arguments on Appeal
Japanese-Auto appealed the district court's ruling. It argued
that the aluminum wheels' distribution within Germany exhausted
BBS' patent right in Japan. 8 Therefore, its sale of the imported
wheels within Japan did not constitute infringement. 9 In effect,
parative Law Journal).
11. See id.
12. Patent infringement cases begin at the district court level. See A. AOKI ET AL,
JAPANESE PATENT AND TRADEMARK LAW P.3 (1976). In each of the fifty district
courts in Japan, one to three judges sit and try the case depending on the complexity of
the suit. See id., Patent suits usually require three judges. See id. The Tokyo and Osaka
District Courts are the most important Japanese district courts for patent infringement
cases. See id. In addition to handling three-fourths of all infringement actions in Japan,
these two courts have special patent sections. See id.
13. See Riordan, supra note 3.
14. See Victoria Slind-Flor, Japanese Ruling Upsets Importers and IP Lawyers, NAT'L
L.., May 1, 1995, at A7.
15. See id.
16. See Elliott J. Hahn, Patents: Recent Japanese Ruling on "First-Sale" Doctrine May
Exacerbate U.S.-Japan Trade Relations, CEB CAL. BUS. L. REP., July 1995, at 25.
17. See id.
18. See Japanese-Auto Products, 1524 HANREI JIHO 3 (Tokyo High Ct., Mar. 23,
1995), translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 6 (July 5, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Com-
parative Law Journal).
19. See id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 6 (July 5,
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Journal).
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Japanese-Auto argued that a patent holder has the right to a roy-
alty the first time it sells a product, but loses that right once it sells
the product to a third party? This theory is called the "first-sale"
doctrine.2 ' Japanese-Auto further questioned the legitimacy of
allowing BBS to receive a second set of profits beyond the first-
sale profits earned in Germany."
On the other hand, BBS maintained that the sale of its prod-
uct in Germany did not exhaust its Japanese patent right. BBS
,wanted Japanese-Auto enjoined from importing the wheels to en-
sure their quality and to secure their safety3 Essentially, BBS ar-
gued that wheels attached to fast-moving cars require strict quality
control to ensure their safety.24 The court conceded that it had
seen cases where faulty packaging and "clumsiness in handling
during transit" harmed the wheels, especially when the wheels
were parallel imported from overseas.2 Furthermore, BBS ar-
gued that allowing parallel importation of its wheels detracted
from the goal of maintaining the quality of patented products and
could cause an unexpected loss to consumers.2 The court ac-
knowledged:
During high speed traveling, wheels are the part (of the auto-
20. Hahn, supra note 16.
21. For a more detailed discussion of the "first-sale" doctrine, as well as its impact
and ramifications, see infra Part IV.
22. See Japanese-Auto Products, 1526 HANREI JIH- 3, translated in Judgment to the
Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 6 (July 5, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal).
23. See id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 4 (July 5,
.1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Journal).
24. See id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 32721994, at 5 (July 5,
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the'Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Journal).
25. Generally, parallel importation occurs when a brand name consumer product,
which a trademark or copyright protects, is sold abroad and imported back to the country
of origin for resale. For a more detailed discussion of parallel importation, see infra Part
III.
26. Japanese-Auto Products, 1524 HANRET JIHO 3, translated in Judgment to the Case
of NE No. 3272/1994, at 5 (July 5, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola
of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal).
27. See id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 17 (July 5,
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Journal).
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mobile) where it is subject to extremely strong and complex
forces of stress, and one may not deny the probability of even a
slight imperfection causing a grave accident. Also, the auto-
mobile manufacturer may alter its specification which may ne-
cessitate the wheel's specification to be changed. An author-
ized dealer would normally notify the registered owners (users)
of the automobile as a routine part of services to customers and
can improve its services by meeting the new specification in-
cluding those wheels as inventories. It is only the authorized
dealers who are capable because it is possible for the author-
ized dealers to maintain intimate exchange of information with
the automobile manufacturer and the wheel manufacturer itself
concerning the products and technology, and obviously, be-
cause the authorized dealer has sufficient stock of wheel parts
(and the like).?
Nevertheless, the Tokyo High Court7 agreed with Japanese-
Auto and ultimately rejected BBS' safety argument.0 The Tokyo
High Court stated unequivocally that the inventor's interest should
be weighed against the societal need for "development of the in-
dustries:"
, 31
When the balance of interests between the two (inventors' vs.
public's) are considered with respect to where the due distribu-
tion of the patent product above noted, if the effects of a patent
right extends to the patent product after due distribution, one
should require permission or agreement by the patentee et al
on every instance when a transfer of the product is intended,
which situation harms the legal (safety) of transactions, hinders
28. Id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. '3272/1994, at 5 (July 5, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Com-
parative Law Journal).
29. In infringement cases, the high court hears new arguments, claims, and defenses
in addition to reviewing the lower court record, facts, and new evidence. AOKI ET AL, su-
pra note 12, at PLA. Appellate court judges frown upon a replay of lower court proceed-
ings and expect litigants to present new arguments. See id. The high courts in Japan gen-
.erally assume a more active role in making final rulings than appellate courts of most
Western legal systems. See id.
30. See Japanese-Auto Products, 1524 HANREI JIHC 3, translated in Judgment to the
Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 17.(July 5, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal).
31. See id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 10 (July 5,
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Journal).
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distribution of the patent products and consequently most
clearly impedes the development of the industries. Such exten-
sion of the effects of patent rights to a time after and beyond
the due distribution sales of the product renders an
(unwarranted and) excessive favoring of (legal) power to a pat-
ent right, which would cause a loss of harmonious balance with
-protection of the interests of the public/society to be obtained
through development of the industries n
Thus, upon balancing, the court held that "there [were] no rational
grounds to allow [BBS] a second opportunity to obtain profit with
respect to sales after and beyond the first distribution. 3 3  The
court concluded that it was "due and fair" to consider BBS' rights
as "exhausted" by its sales within Germany and that a denial of the
requested injunction and damages was consistent with current
Japanese patent law. 4 Additionally, the court held that matters
concerning the effect on the quality of the patented products
"concern the business as a whole as a matter of reliability, and re-
sides [sic] in a dimension foreign to the matter of validity/effects of
a patent right which aims to protect conceptions of technology,
and one has to say that such arguments are undue.,
35
Lastly, BBS argued that allowing "parallel importation of
genuine patent goods will weaken the motivation of obtaining a
patent license, will impede the appearance of numerous technol-
ogy adapted to the requirements of the market and eventually in-
vite monopoly of the world's markets by giant corporations.
36
The court conceded that allowing parallel importation weakens
32. Id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 10 (July 5, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Com-
parative Law Journal).
33. Id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 11 (July 5, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Com-
parative Law Journal).
34. See id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 18 (July 5,
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Journal).
35. Id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 17 (July 5, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Com-
parative Law Journal).
36. Id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 16 (July 5, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Com-
parative Law Journal).
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the motive to obtain a patent license.37 Nevertheless, the court
concluded:
[T]he issue of obtaining a license, or otherwise, to acquire tech-
nology under the patent invention, basically relies on the tech-
nical value of the patent invention under consideration, devel-
opment phase of competitive technology, existence of
alternatives, production costs of the product manufactured un-
der license, and other relevant matters. So far as parallel im-
ports are concerned, there is obviously a limit to the quantity
and price with a genuine patent product which has been duly
distributed in a foreign country, and then parallel-imported.
Then, under such consideration, the Court cannot consider that
approval of parallel importation is a major cause of weakening
the motivation of obtaining license and impedes the prolific
generation and appearance of numerous technology. Further-
more, it is well known that parallel importation of true products
has been carried out for a considerable number of years in Ja-
pan on a broad variety of products. However, after closely
studying all the evidence presented in this case, the Court fails
to find any evidence which shows the fact that such parallel im-
portation has impeded the introduction of licensed technology.
[BBS'] arguments on this point relies [sic] on abstract state-
ments without factual substantiation, and thus are not taken.-
C. The Decision's Effects
The Tokyo High Court's decision in Japanese-Auto Products
departs from long-standing patent customs in most countries, in-
cluding the United States and Japan.3 9 The first-sale doctrine gen-
erally limits domestic patent protection.4° Essentially, the first-sale
doctrine allows a patent holder to collect a royalty for the first sale
of a patented item, but not for subsequent sales to third parties.41
37. See id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 16 (July 5,
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Journal).
38. Id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 16-17 (July 5,
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Journal).
39. See Riordan, supra note 3.
40. See Hahn, supra note 16. This doctrine is analogous to the "exhaustion" doctrine
mentioned in the Tokyo High Court's opinion.
41. Riordan, supra note 3.
1997] 485
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Thus, if the new owner decides to sell the item to a third party, the
original patent holder does not collect a second royalty.42 The first-
sale doctrine traditionally applies, however, only to products resold
within the borders of the country granting the patent, thus prevent-
ing companies from buying patented products in a country where
they are sold at minimal cost and reselling them in another country
with a similar patent for a higher price. 3 The Tokyo High Court's
application of the first-sale or exhaustion doctrine to an interna-
tional sales transaction significantly deviates from settled law.4
Another patent law concept intricately involved with the de-
cision is the "parallel importation" of "gray market, 41 goods. Un-
.der the Japanese-Auto Products facts, BBS' wheels constitute the
gray market goods, and Japanese-Auto's importation of the goods
is the act of parallel importation. Prior to this decision, neither the
United States nor Japan permitted parallel importation of pat-
ented products. 46 Nevertheless, the court's ruling seems to permit
the importation of gray market goods for sale to Japanese con-
sumers with no royalties reverting to the original patent holder.4 ,
This ruling is good news for Japanese consumers who ulti-
mately pay less for brand-name goods.4 On the other hand, Japa-
nese-Auto Products would jeopardize reasonable profits for U.S.
companies holding domestic and Japanese patent rights.49 If the
ruling stands, a company may buy patented goods in the United
States and resell them freely in Japan, irrespective of the patent
holder's rights in both countries50 The strength of the yen and the
high desirability of U.S. goods provide incentive for competitors to
circumvent Japanese patents that U.S. companies obtain and to
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Hahn, supra note 16.
45. The term "gray market" has been used to indicate the doubtful legality of parallel
importation, which lies on the "fringes of legality." See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589
F. Supp. 1163, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). This fringe lies somewhere between legally free
competition and an illegal "black market."
46. See Slind-Flor, supra note 14.
47. See id.
48. See Riordan, supra note 3.
49. See Hahn, supra note 16.
50. See id.
[Vol. 19:479
Japanese-Auto Products v. BBS
import inexpensively produced U.S. goods into Japan.5 Conse-
quently, this ruling lends further credence to the argument that Ja-
pan discriminates against foreign businesses, especially from the
United States.2 Such discrimination may spark new tension in the
already simmering U.S.-Japanese trade relationship.
III. PARALLEL IMPORTATION
A. Parallel Importation in the United States
1. Trademarked Goods
For purposes of trademark law, "parallel imports" or "gray
market"5 goods are genuine, mass-merchandised consumer prod-
ucts with a brand name that a trademark or copyright protects.54
Domestic suppliers usually sell or license to sell these goods under
sales contracts or licensing agreements that restrict their sale to
different global markets, often overseas. 55 Parallel importation oc-
curs when gray market "pirates" import these goods back to the
country of origin for resale, generally against the wishes of domes-
tic suppliers. 6
In the United States, domestic suppliers of trademarked
goods attack the lack of protection against Parallel importation.'
Similar to the free market disdain against alienation relating to the
first-sale doctrine, free market proponents favor "the parallel im-
51. See Riordan, supra note 3.
52. See Hahn, supra note 16.
53. This Note uses the term "gray market" goods as opposed to "parallel imports" to
refer to products discernible from the concept of parallel importation.
54. See Steven L. Hock & Robert A. Weikert, Gray Market Goods, Counterfeit
Goods and the Antitrust Laws, in THE LAW OF GRAY AND COUNTERFEIT GOODS 437,
439 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Property Course Handbook Series
No. 236, 1987). Gray market goods are distinguishable from counterfeit goods. Id.
Counterfeit goods intentionally imitate a product's trademark, whereas gray market
goods have the manufacturer's genuine trademark. Id.
55. See, e.g., J. Joseph Bainton & Kathleen Janetatos Smith, Gray Goods: A Real
Problem with a Genuine Solution, in THE LAW OF GRAY AND COUNTERFEIT GOODS,
supra note 54, at 301,303-04.
56. id.; see, e.g., Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contact Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909
(D.NJ. 1987), vacated, 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1987).
57. See Doris R. Perl, Comment, The Use of Copyright Law to Block the Importation
of Gray-Market Goods: The Black and White of It All, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645, 646-47
(1990).
1997] 487.
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porter's efforts to offer consumers the option of purchasing
[goods] at competitively lower prices."58 "The unauthorized im-
porters have maintained that because their activity encourages
price competition and benefits the consumer, it should be freely
permitted." 9 The importers believe that preventing this competi-
tion "would be inconsistent with the interests of consumers."6'
Gray market goods may, however, cause problems that out-
weigh the benefits to consumers. First, consumers "may be de-
prived of warranty and .products liability protection and may re-
ceive inferior goods.""1  Second, consumer expectations may be
frustrated because the buyer is likely to believe that U.S. trade-
mark laws protect the purchased product.62 Finally, the parallel
importer enjoys a "free ride on the sales and promotional efforts
of the trademark owner."'
Gray market goods substantially affect the domestic market-
place because the parallel importation of such goods has devel-
oped into a multi-billion dollar industry in the United States.6
Consequently, U.S. suppliers are losing profits and the chance to
cultivate foreign markets." U.S. manufacturers who wish to sell
their products in foreign markets may utilize exclusive distributors
58.' Id.
59. TIMOTHY H. HIEBERT, PARALLEL IMPORTATION IN U.S. TRADEMARK LAW 1
(Contributions in Legal Studies No. 74, Paul L. Murphy ed., 1994).
60. Id.
61. Joseph M. Fitzpatrick & William J. Brunet, Barring Importation of Gray Goods
Under Section 42 of the Lanham Act, and Section 526 of the Tariff Act, in GRAY
MARKETS AND PARALLEL IMPORTATION 9, 11 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 217, 1986). The court rejected this argu-
ment. Interestingly, the court acknowledged the significance of this safety issue: "Ithe
parallel importer rarely bothers to have information on the customers who have been sold
the wheels, and there should be a serious possibility that such a crude quality control (in
their business) may lead to unexpected loss and damages on the part of the customers
(users)." Japanese-Auto Products, 1524 HANREI JIHO 3, translated in Judgment to the
Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 5 (July 5, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal); see also Richard B.
Kelly, An Overview of the Influx of Grey Market Goods into the United States, 11 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 231 (1986) (providing an in-depth analysis of the relationship be-
tween gray market goods and specific trademark statutes).
62. See Fitzpatrick & Brunet, supra note 61, at 11.
63. See id. at 12.
64. See Perl, supra note 57, at 678.
65. See id. at 646.
66. See id. at 678.
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who import the product from the manufacturer, sell the product in
their countries and build goodwill in the foreign markets through
advertising. 7 A third party - the parallel importer - however, may
purchase identical products from distributors in other countries
and import those products in direct competition with the exclusive
local distributor.6 Thus, the parallel importer avoids local adver-
tising costs69 and sells the product below the authorized distribu-
tor's prices.70
2. Patented Goods
For the purposes of patent law, gray market imports are
products that are legally produced or sold under a patent in an-
other country, purchased in a foreign market, and imported for
sale back to the United States without the U.S. patent owner's
authorization.7' In the United States, the general rule is that a pat-
ent "grants to the patent holder the right for [twenty] years to ex-
clude others from making, using, or selling the patented invention
within the United States. ' ' 2
B. Parallel Importation in Japan
1. Trademarked Goods
The parallel importation of "genuine goods" has been pro-
tected in Japan since the Osaka District Court's decision in N.M. C.
K.K. v. Shriro Tradine3 (the Parker Pen case). In the Parker Pen
case, plaintiff N.M.C. purchased fifty dozen "genuine" Parker pens
from a Hong Kong company and filed a petition to import the
67. See HIEBERT, supra note 59, at 1.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.; see also Stuart Auerbach, The Gray Market Where a $200 Watch Can Be
Bought for $140, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1984, at L1. •
71. See David Bender & Daniel Gogek, Gray Market Goods: Substantive Law, in
THE LAW OF GRAY AND COUNTERFEIT GOODS 43, supra note 54, at 97-98.
72. Id. at 98; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1984), which states in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes,
uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during the term of
the patent therefore, infringes the patent.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an in-
fringer.
73. 2 MUTAI SAISHU 71, (Osaka Dist. Ct., Feb. 27,1970).
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pens into Japan even though defendant Shriro Trading (Shriro)
had an exclusive distributorship and an exclusive use right.74 The
Osaka Customs Office told N.M.C. that it could not issue an im-
port permit even though Shriro had previously consented because
Shriro had not done so in Writing.15 N.M.C. brought suit, arguing
that Shriro had no right to exclude importation of genuine Parker
pens.6 The court held that although Shriro had an exclusive right,
it could not enjoin the importation or sale of pens manufactured
in the United States bearing the Parker Pen company's mark.7
Tue court reasoned:
The purpose of giving the trademark owner a right of exclusive
use of the registered trademark... is to protect the indication
of source as well as to guarantee the quality from being harmed
by the use of an identical or similar trademark on identical or
similar goods by a third person .... The law purports to main-
tain orderly distribution of goods and protects the interest of
the consuming public by enabling them to identify the goods
that they choose to buy and to obtain goods of the quality they
desire .... Therefore, the scope of the territoriality principle of
trademarks must be determined in the light of the purpose of
trademark protection, and infringement must be determined by
judging whether or not the proper functions of the trademark
are harmed.-
The court limited its opinion to situations where goods of the same
quality were distributed in the world market bearing the same,
trademark.7
This holding influenced tremendously the Japanese govern-
ment's decision to remove restrictions on parallel importation of
genuine goods.80 For the past twenty-five years, court decisions
74. See TERUO DOI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT:
LAW AND PRACTICE IN JAPAN 276-77 (Comparative Law Study Series No. 19,1992).
75. See id at 277.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 277-78.
79. See id. at 279.
80. See id. at 280.
The Tokyo High Court explained the proliferation of parallel importation as follows:
In spite of having purchasing power for higher than the above-average level, be-
cause of Japan's market being inclined to be closed to outsiders, the differences
in compared prices are rather conspicuous; therefore, "parallel importation" of
patent products is being widely practiced. Take, for example, automobiles,
Vol. 19:479490
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have affirmed, with little variation, the N.M.C. holding, which al-
lowed parallel importation of trademarked goods."
2. Patented Goods
Until Japanese-Auto Products, 'Japanese courts had infre-
quently dealt with the issue of parallel importation of patented
goods. Author Teruo Doi stated the issue as follows:
In a case where the owner of a Japanese patent owns the corre-
sponding patent in a foreign country, a question may arise as to
whether an unauthorized importation of the products that were
lawfully manufactured by the owner or by his licensee in that
foreign country infringes his Japanese patent. -
The Japanese-Auto court faced the identical situation. A lack
of precedent regarding parallel importation of patent goods left
much discretion to the Japanese-Auto court. Only one prior court
decision, Brunswick Corp. v. Orion Kogyo K.K.,8 addressed this
specific issue.84
In Brunswick Corp., plaintiff Brunswick Corp. (Brunswick),
owned patents in several countries, including Japan, for an auto-
matic pinsetting device for bowling machines.u Brunswick's
Venezuelan subsidiary, BIAC, sublicensed its Australian patent to
Blackrock Company of Australia.86 Defendant Orion Kogyo
(Orion), who operated a bowling alley in Osaka, imported several
bowling machines with the patented mechanisms.8 7
Orion, like Japanese-Auto, argued that Brunswick's sublicen-
which are a virtual concentration of patents. Among approximately 200,000
automobiles imported in a year, about 10 percent are of parallel importation.
Japanese-Auto Products, 1524 HANREI JIHO 3, translated in Judgment to the Case of NE
No. 3272/1994, at 4 (July 5, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal).
81. See id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 4 (July 5,
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Journal); see also Heiwado K.K. v. K.K. Kinseido, 10 MUTAI SAISHU
216 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., May 31, 1978); La Chemise LaCoste S.A. v. Shinshin Boeki K.K.,
1141 HANREI JIHO 143 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Dec. 7,1984).
82. DOI, supra note 74, at 290.
83. 1 MUrAI SAISHO 160 (Osaka Dist. Ct., June 9, 1969).
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see in Australia had exhausted Brunswick's patent right upon the
sale of the device, and thus, Brunswick could no longer sue for
patent infringement against purchasers of its product. Orion ad-
ditionally argued that the territoriality principle of patent protec-
tion should not extend to Brunswick's patent because trademark
protection is not based on the territoriality principle.90 The court
denounced this argument in favor of a strict territoriality principle
of patent protection:
With respect to trademarks, conflicting views have been ex-
pressed in European countries in connection with the applica-
tion of the territoriality principle on the question of whether or
not importation of genuine trademarked goods constitutes an
infringement of the domestic trademark right concerned. Many
of the arguments which deny infringement point out the pur-
pose of the trademark system lies in the protection of consum-
ing public through the function of'trademarks to distinguish
products, and, from this starting point, they conclude that the
territoriality principle of trademarks should stay one step back
before international free trade in the age of integration of do-
mestic markets of various countries. It is not right to apply, this
theory to patents which have an entirely different purpose and
nature from trademarks. 9'
Thus, the court held that Brunswick's Australian patent was ex-
hausted, but its corresponding Japanese patent was not affected.9
The difference between Japanese-Auto and Brunswick Corp.
is that in Brunswick Corp., a licensee of Brunswick manufactured
the bowling mechanism, whereas in Japanese-Auto, BBS, not a li-
censee, manufactured the wheels. This slight factual difference
should not justify a different outcome. Nevertheless, the Japanese-
Auto court, departed from the Brunswick court's ruling on parallel
88. See id. at 290-91.
89. "[T]he territoriality theory posits trademark rights in a particular region and in
the goodwill created by the owner in the regional sale of the product. A trademark could
have separate legal existence in each country under the laws of that country." Shubha
Ghosh, An Economic Analysis of the Common Control Exception to Gray Market Exclu-
sion, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373, 385 (1994) (footnote omitted); see also SETH E.
LIPNER, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF GRAY MARKET GoODS 14 (1990)
(discussing the history of the territoriality theory).
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importation of patent goods. The court's ruling against BBS de-
parts from the territoriality principle, previously thought to be set-
tled international patent law."
Like Brunswick, BBS disputed Japanese-Auto's argument as
violating the principles of patent independence and territorial ju-
risdiction under articles 2 and 4-bis of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Intellectual Property (Paris Convention)." Courts
93. In 1930, Stephen P. Ladas was "the first [person] to endow the [principle of terri-
toriality] with its modern meaning." HIEBERT, supra note 59, at 144 n. 13. Ladas wrote:
In the Anglo-American world the territorial conception of law and rights in-
cludes the industrial property, namely, these legalized private interests in incor-
poreal things .... But the same principle of territoriality is also admitted in the
other countries in regard to rights of industrial property. That is, when the law
turns a private interest in an invention or a goodwill into property, this property
is a mere creature of that law, and it can therefore exist only so far as the law
that creates it extends. Consequently, a patent granted in country A cannot ex-
tend outside the territory of that country. And similarly, a trademark right ac-
quired in one country is effective only in the country where it was acquired.
STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY "17
(1930) (footnote omitted). Fritz Ostertag categorized the principle of territoriality as a
choice-of-law rule:
The first rule concerning the applicability of law 'is as follows: the court of the
country where protection of industrial property is claimed shall apply the do-
mestic law (lex fori) (principle of territoriality) .... Suppose that a trademark,
registered in the United States, is registered in Switzerland as well. The legal
form of the mark and all conditions of its existence are judged according to
American law.
FRITZ OSTERTAG, International Unions for the Protection of Industrial, Literary and Ar-
tistic Property, 25 MICH. L. REV. 107, 109-10 (1926).
. 94. Article 4-bis of the Paris Convention espoused the patent independence princi-
ple.
[T]he establishment of a patent right, its effects and expiration ... are inde-
pendent within each country; i.e., any changes with a patent in another country
shall not influence the patent in your own country. Therefore, if one believes
that where a patent right in Country "A" [e.g. Germany] is exhausted by the due
distribution (sales) of the patent product in the country, the patent right in coun-
try "B" [e.g. Japan] having the same contents as in country "A" and owned by
the same person shall obviously been [sic] exhausted, such consideration should
clearly stand against the principles [sic] of Patent Independence.
Japanese-Auto Products, 1524 HANRE! JIHO 3, translated in Judgment to the Case of NE
No. 3272/1994, at 7 (July 5, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los
Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal).
95. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 25
Stat. 1372. See, e.g., Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 823, 828 (Int'l Trade Comm.
1984); Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700,705 n.1 (D.NJ. 1985).
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often cite thd Paris Convention to justify the territoriality theory.96
Prior to 1883, trademark laws of many countries tended to dis-
criminate against foreign trademark owners who wished to register
their trademarks in those countries.9 Each nation "made it diffi-
cult for foreigners'to enjoy domestic trademark protection."98
Some countries entered into commercial treaties containing
"reciprocal treatment" provisions." These agreements granted
rights and privileges to each trademark holder in the jurisdiction of
the other nation.' ® Depending on the -presence of bilateral treaty
protection and its particular terms of protection, some trademark
holders still enjoyed more favored status than others.'1 In re-
sponse to these problems, the Paris Convention established the
Union for the Protection of Industrial Property.' Each member
country agreed to accord to citizens of other countries the same
trademark rights that it granted to its own citizens.' °3'
IV. FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE
The first-sale doctrine potentially establishes a compelling de-
fense to the gray market importer. °4 The U.S. Supreme Court first
introduced the first-sale doctrine in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.0 5
The doctrine developed over time, and Congress eventually codi-
fied it in 17 U.S.C. § 109(a),'06 which reflected Congress' apparent
agreement with the traditional free market notion against re-






102. See id. at 134-35.
103. See id. at 135.
104. See Bender & Gogek, supra note 71, at 91.
105. 210 U.S. 339,350-51 (1908).
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), which provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy
or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such
owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or oth-
erwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
Interestingly, this provision says nothing about whether an actual "sale" has to occur; the
language only pertains to ownership.
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straints on alienation.' Because 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) pertains to
copyright infringement, it does not yield an absolute defense to
patent infringement claims in domestic cases by protecting the re-
sale of the product."' Nevertheless, this section sheds light on the
first-sale doctrine and its significance to the Japanese-Auto case.,°9
In BMG Music v. Perez," the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated
that the first-sale doctrine applies to foreign copyright infringe-
ment cases only when the "first sale" is made in the United
States.' In BMG Music, defendant, Edmundo Perez purchased
copyrighted sound recordings manufactured abroad, imported
them into the United States, and sold them in retail outlets."2 The
court pointed out that "[t]he first sale doctrine in 17 U.S.C. §
109(a) does not ... provide a defense to infringement under 17
U.S.C. § 602"' for goods manufactured abroad."'"1 4 The Ninth Cir-
cuit stated: "the words 'lawfully made under this title' in section
109(a) grant first sale protection only to copies legally made and
sold in the U.S."" 5
Cases involving the interplay between section 17 U.S.C. §
109(a) and 17 U.S.C. § 602 often arise where goods are both manu-
107. See Per], supra note 57, at 651.
108. See id. Yet, gray market plaintiffs have increasingly turned to copyright law and §
109(a) for protection. Ghosh, supra note 89, at 397. The problem with this idea, however,
is "the possibility of copyright law enveloping the domain of trademark law." Id Ar-
guably, if copyright law is applied to trademark areas like labels and product names,
trademark law could be avoided totally. See id. For an argument that extending copy-
right law to the gray market area is not as adverse to copyright policy as one might think,
see Donna K. Hintz, Comment, Battling Gray Market Goods with Copyright Law, 57
ALB. L. REV. 1187 (1994).
109. "Unlike trademark statutes and regulations which have been extensively and de-
cisively analyzed, the copyright provisions invoked by suppliers and gray market import-
ers have not undergone intensive judicial scrutiny. In fact, few appellate courts have yet
commented on the problem in any detail." Perl, supra note 57, at 651 (footnote omitted).
110. BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991).
111. Id. at 319. This concept was affirmed in Parfurns Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Empo-
rium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477,481 (9th Cir. 1994).
112. BMG Music, 952 F.2d at 319.
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994), which states: "[i]mportation into the United
States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title.., of a work that
[has] been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to
distribute copies... under section 106."
114. BMG Music, 952 F.2d at 319.
115. Id.; see also CBS, Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distrib., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa.
1983), affd mem., 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984).
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factured and first sold abroad."" These decisions have held that
the party entitled to a first-sale royalty could block the importation
of the goods under 17 U.S.C. § 602 and have denied importers a
defense under 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)."7 In effect, 17 U.S.C. § 602 pre-
empts any defenses available under 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
The first'major case to focus on the interplay between these
two statutes was CBS v. Scorpio Music Distributors, Inc."" - CBS,
like Japanese-Auto, involved goods that were manufactured and
first sold abroad. The defendant distributor of phonorecords used
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) as its defense. 9 It argued that because an
authorized first sale abroad was the source of the records that it
had purchased for sale in the United States, CBS' rights were ex-
hausted after the first sale."" The court refused to allow 17 U.S.C.
§ 109 to supersede 17 U.S.C. § 602, concluding that the first-sale
defense under 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) did not extend overseas.
121
The Tokyo High Court's ruling in Japanese-Auto could be
viewed as inconsistent with the principles behind 17 U.S.C. § 602,
and thus, a departure' from patent law principles in the United
States and the international trade arena.'2 The court focused its
attention on articles 2 and 4-bis of the Paris Convention.23 "[I]t is
clear that the Japanese Patent Law limits its application and valid-
ity to territorial Japan, i.e., Japan also adopts the Principle of Ter-
ritorial Jurisdiction."'2 4 BBS argued, however, that if exhaustion of
patent rights on a product in a foreign country exhausted patent
rights on the same product in one's home country, then the patent
rights would be internationally exhausted, which would violate the
116. See Perl, supra note 57, at 651; see also Hearst Corp. v. Stark, 639 F. Supp. 970
(N.D. Cal. 1986).
117. See Perl, supra note 57, at 651-52.
118. 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd mem., 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984).
119. See Bender & Gogek, supra note 71, at 92.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Hahn, supra note 16.
123. See Japanese-Auto Products, 1524 HANREI JIHO 3, translated in Judgment to the
Case of NE, No. 3272/1994, at 7 (July 5, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal).
124. Id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 7 (July 5, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Com-
parative Law Journal).
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principles of patent independence and territorial jurisdiction.'2
The Tokyo High Court considered BBS' international ex-
haustion theory, but ultimately rejected it.26 "[U]nder the Princi-
ples of Patent Independence and Territorial Jurisdiction, the valid-
ity of the patent right established by Japan's Patent Law should be
interpreted by Japan's interpretation of the Japanese Patent
Law."' 2 Thus, whether the court may take into account the sale or
distribution of the patented product in a foreign country is a mat-
ter of interpretation of Japan's patent law, not of the Paris Con-
vention's by-laws.'2
The court rejected both BBS' territoriality and past precedent
arguments regarding patent protection in the international arena.
This ruling ostensibly benefits Japanese consumers, who often pay
higher prices for identical goods sold for significantly less in other
countries. 129 It may, however, also preclude patent-holders in for-
eign countries from getting a fair price for their products in Ja-
pan.1
30
V. CURRENT TENSION IN U.S.-JAPANESE TRADE RELATIONS AND
THE EFFECTS OF THE JAPANESE-A UTO DECISION
A. Background on U.S.-Japanese Trade Relations
Westerners, particularly U.S. residents, believe that a horrible
economic slump in the 1990s damaged Japan, however, the evi-
dence, does not support this conclusion.' 3' For example, the yen
125. See id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 7-8 (July 5,
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Journat).
126. See id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 7-8 (July 5,
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Journa).
127. Id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 8 (July 5, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Com-
parative Law Journal).
128. See id., translated in Judgment to the Case of NE No. 3272/1994, at 8 (July 5,
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Journal).
129. Riordan, supra note 3.
130. See Slind-Flor, supra note 14.
131. See Eamonn Fingleton, Japan's Invisible Leviathan, FOREIGN APF., MariApr.
1995, at 69.
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continues to remain very strong, having risen nearly forty percent
against the U.S. dollar over the past five years.32 In 1994, the U.S.
trade deficit with Japan climbed to $62 billion-an all-time high.
3
Additionally, growth in Japan's exports created an unprecedented
trade surplus of $127 billion.' 34 Thus, Japan is clearly not an eco-
nomic "has been." Perhaps when Westerners experienced an eco-
nomic slump in their own land, they naturally thought that it hit
Japan with the same force."'
While the Western press talks of economic collapse, Japan
remains on schedule to surge past the United States and become
the world's largest economy by the millennium. 136 The United
States figured to share in this Japanese surge. For example, in the
1980s, Prime Minister Nakasone led President Ronald Reagan to
believe that the Japanese government was ready to undergo a pe-
riod of "internal demand stimulation" to encourage U.S. imports
and reduce Japanese exports.17 This never happened.
"This peculiar dynamic of imminent turning points that seem
always to recede before they can be realized has become charac-
teristic of U.S.-Japan .trade relations.' 3 1 Thus, each side tends to
react with-criticism to the other side's good faith.3 1 Japanese soci-
ety denounces U.S. products as poorly designed and weakly mar:
keted.40 In contrast, U.S. society attacks Japanese industrial and
social policies as protectionist and criticizes Japanese fiscal policy
as too restrictive.14' As a result, the trade relationship between Ja-
132. See id.
133. See Martin Crustinger, Japan, U.S. Play Down Pre-Summit Frictions, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., Jan. 10, 1995, at C03, available in 1995 WL 5826842. The latest numbers
recorded in November 1995, however, are encouraging, as they show that the U.S. trade
deficit with Japan declined for the fifth consecutive month. James Gerstenzang, U.S.
Trade Deficit Hits Lowest Level in Two Years, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1996, at D1.
134. See Fingleton, supra note 131, at 69.
135. It cannot be said, however, that Japan's financial markets have not undergone a
scare within the past ten years. For example, the Tokyo stock market dropped 63% in the
early 1990s. See id. at 70.
136. See id. at 69.
137. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Foreword The Structure of US.-Japan Trade Relations, 27
HARV. INT'L L.J. 343 (1986).
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pan and the United States has remained quite strained. The U.S.
mistrust of Japan's intentions and vice versa has hindered any ad-
vancement in the countries' trade relations. As the two countries
vie for economic supremacy, a tense trade atmosphere, has inevi-
tably developed and burgeoned.
B. Limited Access to the Japanese Market
U.S. residents find it difficult to ignore the substantial eco-
nomic imbalance between Japan and the world market. At the
forefront of this imbalance are Japan's unique market access bar-
riers. 42 "They stem from the complex interaction of Japan's eco-
nomic structure, private business organizations and practices, rela-
tions between the Japanese private sector, and government, and
government policies and.regulatory practices."' 43 The Japanese sys-
tem appears impenetrable because, unlike tariffs, these barriers
are not traditional barriers to trade.
Unpredictable economic regulations add to this problem.
1 44
Japanese legislators often write economic laws in general rather
than specific terms, and administrative officials supply the de-
tails. 45 The broad discretion of government officials makes it
nearly impossible for foreign businesses to learn Japanese business
requirements.
46
Furthermore, business practices between producers and sup-
pliers, distributors and producers, and other companies within an
industry group also hinder market access for foreign entrants.
4 7
These practices prevent foreign businesses from gaining customers
on the basis of factors such as price, quality, and service.' 4 Fur-
ther, Japan's anti-monopoly laws are largely ineffective; numerous
exceptions, lax enforcement, and inadequate penalties plague
them.
149
142. See Charlene Barshefsky, The Future of U.S.-Japan Trade Relations, 25 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1287, 1292 (1994).
143. Id.
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Finally, Japan's outdated and expensive distribution system
continues to block foreign firms from gaining access to the Japa-
nese market.150 Foreign businesses find it difficult and costly to en-
ter existing distribution channels, much less to formulate their own
channels.
Consequently, Japan's domestic markets are clearly less open
to foreign competition than other countries' markets.1 2  Despite
years of "market-opening" efforts, critics of Japanese policy re-
main on the offensive regarding easing access to Japanese con-
sumers2 * A total opening of the Japanese market would result in
a huge expansion of U.S. exports from $9 to $18 billion annually,
which would lead to the creation of 180,000 to 360,000 jobs in the
United States alone.'5'
-Critics argue that U.S. businesses are not the only losers in a
restricted market. The burden of Japan's closed market and sub-
sequent inflated prices for goods falls "most heavily on its own
people."'5 5 Hence, Japanese consumers have become restless With
their government for "coddling" Japanese companies.5 6 The pros-
pect of a new market with eager buyers willing to purchase U.S.
goods led the Clinton Administration to pursue a bilateral trade
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 1287.
153. See id. at 1287-88.
154. See id.
155. See id. Japanese businesses, as well as consumers, suffer as a result of limited ac-
cess. "Limited market access in Japan fosters inefficiencies that slow economic growth
and today hamper the competitiveness and productivity of Japanese business. Japan's
policies therefore burden not only Japanese consumers, but the Japanese economy
overall, and with it, the world economy." Id.
156. Editorial, Now, Ante Up, ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 30, 1995, at 8. With the new
trade pact, Japan's strict trade policy and its concomitant burden on Japanese consumers
became readily apparent.
As new discount houses spring up to sell cheap foreign merchandise, Japan's
once unassailable distribution cartels are coming under heavy pressure. They
are being forced to cut prices and, because of protections they have enjoyed,
they have plenty of room to cut. This indicates that the cartels and doniestic
manufacturers have indeed been gouging consumers. Government protections
for this derive from Japan's long-standing policy of using its domestic market
base as a springboard for its export industries, a policy that demands strong
profits in the home market.
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pact with Japan. The pact's paramount goal was to open Japan's
markets.'7
C. The 1995 Trade Pact
After two years of negotiations, the United States and Japan
finally reached a trade agreement in June 1995.158 The agreement
came after President Clinton's threat to level one hundred percent
tariffs on several Japanese car models 59 Although the accord,
which U.S. officials have praised, has averted a trade war between
the two countries, it does not appear to be a complete victory for
the United States. 60 While U.S. auto parts manufacturers bene-
fited from Japan's pledge to purchase $9 billion in U.S. made auto
parts, Japanese car plants operating in the United States will pur-
chase more than two-thirds of the parts.1 6' Additionally, the trade
agreement may not deserve full credit for Japan's pledge because
Japanese car makers set their sights on producing cars in the
United States several years earlier.'62 Essentially, the trade pact
compelled Japan's major automakers to set U.S. expansion goals
down on paper, but did not fully commit to opening the Japanese
market to all Western industries.1 63 Imports to major economic
sectors in Japan, such as telecommunications, medical equipment,
and insurance, are still subject to limits.'"
More U.S. cars will end up in the Japanese market due to the
trade agreement.' 65 Although the auto industry seems to be the
only foreign industry that Japan is willing to allow, this appears to
satisfy the goal of access to the once restricted Japanese market.
As a result of this trade pact, U.S. relations with Japan seem to be
157. See Barshefsky, supra note 142, at 1289.
158. See U.S., Japan Both Claim Victory, supra note 1.
159. See id
160. See Editorial, Who Won? Trade War Armistice, ARIz. REPUBLIC, June 30, 1995,




164. See Barshefsky, supra note 142, at 1290-91.
165. In February 1996, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor said: "Our exports
to Japan are increasing at a rate four times our imports." Gerstenzang, supra note 133, at
DI. Additionally, Kantor said exports of American cars and automobile parts to Japan
had climbed 36% during 1995. At the same time, Japanese auto exports declined by 5%.
See id.
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on the upswing. The Japanese-Auto decision may, however, end
these new found hopes and trigger another trade-crisis. ,
D. The Effects of the Japanese-Auto Decision on U.S. -Japanese
Trade Relations
On the average, prices for goods in Japan are thirty-seven
percent higher than in the United States.' " Thus, the Japanese-
Auto decision may encourage an increase in the parallel importa-
tion of U.S. goods into Japan. Because of these higher prices, U.S.
intellectual property holders will argue that they should receive
the Japanese market's potential benefits-notably higher prices
and higher profits. If Japanese-Auto is affirmed, however, "a com-
pany could buy patented goods-in a foreign country and resell the
goods in Japan, despite the patent holder's rights in both countries.
The patent holder's marketing efforts in Japan would always be
subject to an importer's ability to undersell the patent holder." 6 7
The Japanese-Auto ruling quickly prompted peace-making
missions from Japan to both Germany and the United States. 68 In-
tellectual property experts from Japan and the United States met
only weeks after the decision." 9 The peace-making missions may
indicate that Japan's intellectual property leaders believe that the
Japanese-Auto decision cannot stand and is consistent with past
Japanese discrimination of foreign businesses. On the other hand,
the missions may simply be government "damage -control," to
make it appear that government and patent officials are denounc-
ing the ruling, even though they are happy with it.
VI. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE JAPANESE-AUTO
DECISION
A. Can This Decision Actually Hurt Japan?
The Japanese-Auto decision may hurt Japanese businesses. A
few critics of the decision have addressed the situation where
goods are made in Japan, imported and sold in the United States,
and then parallel imported by a foreign company to Japan, thereby
166. See Barshefsky, supra note 142, at 1292.
167. Hahn, supra note 16.
168. See Slind-Flor, supra note 14.
169. See id.
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circumventing the Japanese patent holder's right to a second
profit. For example, suppose Japanese- manufactured wheels sold
in the United States were resold in Japan by a U.S. business. Pur-
suant to the Japanese-Auto decision, the foreign-owned U.S. busi-
ness rightfully profits upon the sale in Japan.
Because of the loosening of access to Japan's market and ex-
orbitant prices, particularly in the auto parts sector, this type of
situation is increasingly likely to occur as the year 2000 ap-
proaches. Thus, Japan's own businesses could be on the short end
of this decision. If the impetus behind the court's ruling is to pro-
tect Japanese businesses, then the decision against BBS may back-
fire.
B. Why Should Intellectual Property Holders Profit a Second Time
Anyway?
Another aspect of the Japanese-Auto decision is that its
harshest critics favor allowing intellectual property holders to
profit, regardless of the situation. Critics argue, that the disparity
in prices between markets like the United States and Japan should
enable the patent holder to capitalize on the higher prices; the
owner of the trademark or patent is entitled to the profits from any
sale in another country.
Such profits, however, are merely windfall profits, and noth-
ing in international intellectual property law mandates windfall
profits. For example, BBS already profited from the first sale in
Germany. Thus, there is no reason that it should profit again just
because the resale occurred in another country. Enabling BBS to
profit from the higher prices in Japan only creates windfall profits.
If intellectual property holders are not entitled to these so-called
windfall profits, then the Japanese-Auto ruling is consistent with
this ideal.
C. Should Intellectual Property Rules Be Applied Internationally?
A solution to the problem may be to recognize the dominant
influence of the international market and apply intellectual prop-
erty rules internationally rather than territorially. If the first-sale
doctrine applies in the United States, why should it not apply in-
ternationally as well? Also, if the U.S. purports to be an avid pro-
ponent of free markets, then it should support the Japanese-Auto
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corporation acting in its best interests by capitalizing on the second
sale of the wheels. By criticizing the Japanese-Auto decision, U.S.
officials appear determined to have the law work both ways in fa-
vor of U.S. businesses.
17 0
The Japanese-Auto court addressed the issue of applying rules
internationally in the end of its opinion:
Again furthermore, the matter of allowing, or not allowing,
parallel importation of patent products differs legally from one
country to another, or even one region to another, and are [sic]
not consistent over the world; also, there are many attempts to
reach and enter into international agreements or treaties in the
field of intellectual property including patent rights. [This]
Court is quite aware of these conspicuous facts. Now, the posi-
tion of the many countries with respect to economic status vary
over a wide range depending on their historical, economical
and technical background, and their legal disposition towards
parallel importation are certainly not consistently [sic]. How-
ever, given that international agreements are not established
with respect to parallel importation, such should not influence
the interpretation of the Japanese Patent Law that parallel im-




Thus, the court seemed pessimistic about the viability of a coher-
ent international rule on intellectual property encompassing all
countries. In other words, BBS should hot be entitled to profit be-
cause its patent was exhausted once its wheels were sold in Ger-
many.
VII. CONCLUSION
BBS has appealed the Tokyo High Court's ruling. If the
ruling is affirmed, the United States may seek to have it modified
in some way.'7 An enormous U.S. outcry that could threaten sig-
nificant gains in U.S.-Japanese trade may lead the Japanese gov-
170. Additional U.S. arguments such as protecting domestic employment, industrial
protection, and balance of trade arguments may be irrelevant because parallel importa-
tion usually does not involve U.S. manufacturing jobs. See Kelly, supra note 61, at 243.
171. Japanese Auto-Products, 1524 HANREI JIHO 3, translated in Judgment to the Case
of NE No. 3272/1994, at 17-18 (July 5, 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Journal).
172. See Slind-Flor, supra note 14.
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ernment to issue regulations narrowing the ruling or Japan's par-
liament to overrule it.'73
Although some have loudly criticized it the Japanese-Auto
ruling arguably may not have as much impact on U.S.-Japanese
relations as its opponents suggest. The real problem regarding
U.S.-Japanese relations is limited access to Japanese markets.
With the recent trade pact and tightening trade deficit with Japan,
however, this problem seems to be waning. Because trademark
and patent issues do not significantly affect the trade deficit prob-
lem, Japanese-Auto may not really jeopardize all that was gained
in the pact.
Nonetheless, the Japanese-Auto decision will undoubtedly af-
fect foreign companies' ability to do business in Japan, which some
opponents of the decision see as the bottom line. Because U.S.
products are fervently sought in Japan, U.S. businesses will suffer
more than other foreign companies.17 4 Despite the trade pact and
shrinking trade deficit, the affirmation of Japanese-Auto will give
further ammunition to critics of Japanese trade practice. Critics
will argue that the decision epitomizes Japan's blatant discrimina-
tion against foreign businesses. The peace-making missions that
Japan sent to Germany and the United States suggest that Japan
thinks this opinion will be pervasive.
The Japanese-Auto ruling will definitely impact future patent
and trademark custom in the international context. The loosening
of Japanese trade barriers will enable businesses to sell products in
Japan after the first sale in the country of origin. As such sales oc-
cur, other countries' courts may follow the Tokyo High Court's
lead and rule the same way, which would only lead to greater fric-
tion between normally hospitable trading partners.
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